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Competing with Antitrust Laws
HOW NEW YORK’S POST AND HOLD LIQUOR LAW
WILL LOSE AGAINST THE SHERMAN ACT
INTRODUCTION
The distribution and sale of alcohol has a colorful past
in this country,1 and in certain respects, remains controversial
to this day.2 While we no longer live in the “Wild West” and are
thus no longer concerned with the dangers of saloons,3 alcohol
is still linked to a host of societal problems.4 In response to the
social evils tied to alcohol, the states rely on both their police
powers and the authority granted to them by the Twenty-first
Amendment to promote temperance.5 Accordingly, the states
have enacted a variety of laws designed to achieve this goal.6

1

See generally Sidney J. Spaeth, The Twenty-First Amendment and State
Control Over Intoxicating Liquor: Accommodating the Federal Interest, 79 CAL. L. REV.
161, 165-80 (1991) (recounting the origins of the battle for prohibition as linked to “the
ubiquitous image of the debauched saloon” as fuel for the temperance movement). For
example, in the 1800s, violence broke out against saloons, and women who were
advocating temperance resorted to attacking saloons, with the hatchet as their “weapon
of choice.” See id. at 169 (describing Carry Nation’s “‘hatchetations’ on Kansas saloons”).
2
See infra note 12 and accompanying text.
3
See Clayton L. Silvernail, Smoke, Mirrors and Myopia: How the States Are
Able to Pass Unconstitutional Laws Against the Direct Shipping of Wine in Interstate
Commerce, 44 S. TEX. L. REV. 499, 505 (2003).
4
Alcohol is a leading cause of car accidents, especially car accident fatalities.
See, e.g., Bureau of Transportation Services: Table 2-20: Fatalities in Crashes by
Number of Vehicles and Alcohol Involvement, http://www.bts.gov/publications/national
_transportation_statistics/html/table_02_20.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2010); MADD
Campaign to Eliminate Drunk Driving: Statistics, http://www.madd.org/DrunkDriving/Drunk-Driving/Statistics/AllStats.aspx (last visited Jan. 4, 2010). Alcohol is a
necessary component of binge drinking and often a major factor in hazing among
college students. See generally HANK NUWER, WRONGS OF PASSAGE: FRATERNITIES,
SORORITIES, HAZING, AND BINGE DRINKING (1999). Excessive use of alcohol leads to
severe liver damage and is actually the “[third] leading lifestyle-related cause of death
for people in the United States each year.” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention:
Alcohol and Public Health, http://www.cdc.gov/alcohol/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2010).
5
“The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession
of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of
the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.” U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2.
6
See, e.g., infra notes 34, 99, 106, 151-152 and accompanying text.
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New York, like many other states,7 has enacted “price posting”
and “post and hold” liquor laws designed to regulate the
distribution of alcohol within the state.8 New York’s price
posting law requires manufacturers and wholesalers to file
price schedules that report future prices.9 The law is also
considered a “post and hold” law, as it requires them to make
resale prices public, then hold those prices for a defined period
of time, rather than allow prices to fluctuate based on market
forces.10
As with many other liquor laws,11 there has been
controversy over the years regarding the validity of the price
posting laws, especially those classified as post and hold.12 This
Note argues that New York’s post and hold law is in
contravention of the Sherman Antitrust Act13 and hard to
defend under current Twenty-first Amendment jurisprudence,
which has steadily limited the broad grant of powers given to
the states regarding the control of liquor within their borders.
Part I provides background information on both the
history of alcohol distribution in the United States and the
Sherman Act, as well as a brief overview of New York’s
distribution system. Part II analyzes the evolution of the
United States Supreme Court jurisprudence on the Twentyfirst Amendment, illustrating how the Court has shifted its
interpretation of the Amendment from a broad grant of
authority to the states over liquor regulation to a balancing of
competing interests.14 Part III examines the steps of a federal
antitrust challenge to a state law, and describes the federal
decisions that specifically address the validity of price posting
laws in Oregon,15 Maryland,16 and Washington,17 which closely
resemble New York’s statute. Part IV concludes that the New
7

For example, Oregon, Maryland, and Washington all had price posting
laws. See infra notes 222-223, 235, 249 and accompanying text.
8
See N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 101-b (McKinney 2009).
9
Id. § 101-b(3)(a).
10
Id. § 101-b(3)(b).
11
See, e.g., infra notes 34, 97-99, 106, 151-152 and accompanying text.
12
See Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Maleng, 522 F.3d 874, 895-96 (9th Cir. 2008)
(holding that Washington’s “post and hold” liquor distribution regime violated the
Sherman Act); accord TFWS, Inc. v. Schaefer, 242 F.3d 198, 209-10 (4th Cir. 2001);
Miller v. Hedlund, 813 F.2d 1344, 1349-51 (9th Cir. 1987); see also infra Part III.B.
13
See 15 U.S.C. § 1-7 (2006).
14
See infra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
15
See Miller, 813 F.2d 1344.
16
See TFWS, Inc., 242 F.3d 198.
17
See Costco, 522 F.3d 874.
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York statute will not be able to survive an antitrust challenge
in light of these recent cases because the state most likely
cannot put up the formidable defense now required by the
Supreme Court. As it stands, New York’s post and hold regime
should be struck down if challenged in court.
In late 2009, the New York State Law Revision
Commission completed a two-year review of the New York
Alcohol Beverage Control Law (the “ABC Law”), of which price
posting is one narrow issue.18 In its final report, the
Commission flagged Section 101-b as a potential source of legal
problems for the state due to the evolving nature of Twentyfirst Amendment jurisprudence, especially in light of the
invalidation of several post and hold liquor laws by the federal
courts.19 Thus, the state may actually be in a good position to
take protective action if it so desires.
I.

BACKGROUND OF ALCOHOL AND ANTITRUST LAWS

A.

A Brief History of Alcohol Distribution in the United
States

With the exception of Prohibition, there has always been
prolific regulation of commerce in alcohol by the states, largely
because governments viewed it as a source of revenue.20 The
real controversy over alcohol regulation began in the early to
mid-1800s, when religious opposition began to form against
alcohol consumption.21 As a result of the lobbying efforts of antisaloon groups and temperance societies, many states passed
laws banning saloons and the “manufacture of ‘spirituous or

18

See NEW YORK STATE LAW REVISION COMMISSION REPORT ON THE ALCOHOL
BEVERAGE CONTROL LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION 1, 23 (December 15, 2009), available
at http://www.lawrevision.state.ny.us/abcls.php (last visited Feb. 18, 2010).
19
See id. at 217-20 (warning that the fact that Section 101-b survived an
earlier antitrust challenge “should not make . . . the Legislature sanguine about the
price posting and hold requirements.”).
20
See RICHARD MCGOWAN, GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF THE ALCOHOL
INDUSTRY: THE SEARCH FOR REVENUE AND THE COMMON GOOD 3-6, 35 (1997)
(“Throughout the history of the American alcohol industry, government has played a
pivotal role in determining where, when, and how alcoholic beverages are sold. Every
level of government (federal, state, and local) has revenue as well as regulatory interest
in the industry.”).
21
See W. J. Rorabaugh, Reexamining the Prohibition Amendment, 8 YALE
J.L. & HUMAN. 285, 288 (1996) (“The temperance campaign that started in the 1820’s
demanded personal abstinence both as the price of church membership and as a badge
of middle-class respectability.”); MCGOWAN, supra note 20, at 41 (noting that there was
no religious opposition to the alcohol industry prior to the 1850s).
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intoxicating liquors.’”22 Enforcement was largely unsuccessful
because liquor continued to be smuggled across state lines,23
and ultimately, the laws were repealed or struck down by state
courts, at least in part, as unconstitutional.24 However, when
the issue reached the Supreme Court in Mugler v. Kansas,25 the
Court held that complete prohibition of alcohol sale and
production was within a state’s police power.26 Thirteen years
later, the Supreme Court declared that Mugler “stood for the
‘undoubted right’ of states to regulate their internal affairs.”27
While the states were given free range to extensively
regulate alcohol within their borders, Prohibitionists28 were
22

Silvernail, supra note 3, at 505; see also Spaeth, supra note 1, at 168-69.
These laws were commonly referred to as “Maine laws.” See id. (internal quotation
marks omitted); see also Rorabaugh, supra note 21, at 288-89 (noting that Maine was
the first state to enact prohibition).
23
Rorabaugh, supra note 21, at 289.
24
There were several factors that led to the repeal of most of these early
prohibition laws. First, they met strong opposition from immigrants and anti-reform
groups. See JACK S. BLOCKER, IAN R. TYRRELL, AND DAVID M. FAHEY, ALCOHOL AND
TEMPERANCE IN MODERN HISTORY: A GLOBAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 395 (2003) (explaining
that immigrants and anti-reform groups became instrumental in the demise of the
Maine laws by joining anti-temperance coalitions to speak out against them).
Moreover, the laws were undermined by court rulings, including being struck down as
unconstitutional. See, e.g., People v. Toynbee, 2 Parker Crim. Rep. 329 (N.Y. 1855)
(finding that the prohibition of the sale of intoxicating liquors was an unconstitutional
interference with property in violation of individuals’ due process rights); see also
BLOCKER, supra at 395 (by the end of the Civil War, most prohibition laws were
“unenforced, overturned, or struck down by state courts as unconstitutional.”); see also
RICHARD F. HAMM, SHAPING THE EIGHTEENTH AMENDMENT: TEMPERANCE REFORM,
LEGAL CULTURE, AND THE POLITY, 1880-1920, at 20 (1995) (stating that most
prohibition laws were rendered ineffective by the courts). Finally, the Civil War
distracted proponents of temperance, to the point where “progress” was not only halted
but reversed. Id. Even the laws that still survived after the Civil War suffered from
“admittedly lax enforcement.” Id.
25
123 U.S. 623 (1887). Kansas was the first state to “go dry” by going further
than the Maine laws and amending its constitution to forbid the manufacture and sale
of alcohol within its borders. See Silvernail, supra note 3, at 505-06.
26
Mugler, 123 U.S. at 662.
27
Silvernail, supra note 3, at 507 (quoting Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100, 122
(1890)) (“The effect of Leisy and prior decisions . . . was to give states carte blanche
with regards to regulating intoxicating liquors within their bounds.”).
28
An early group of Prohibitionists were working-class Americans—the
Washingtonians—who “pledg[ed] not to drink any alcoholic liquors.” See HAMM, supra
note 24, at 20. The movement spread to the middle class, who also sought to end
alcohol consumption. Id. After the Civil War, abstinence increasingly became a
religious talking point, “[i]n particular, pietists, members of evangelical sects, including
Baptists, Methodists, and Presbyterians . . . saw prohibition as a needed corrective to
the nation’s moral laxity and resulting social problems.” Id. at 22 (noting that religion
was linked with ethnicity, and therefore Americans of English, Scottish, and
sometimes Scandinavian descent were more likely to support Prohibition than the
Irish, German, Italian, and Polish.) Two major Prohibitionist groups were the
Prohibition Party, whose members came primarily from the Republican Party, and the
National Women’s Christian Temperance Union, which consisted of middle-class
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concerned that the states could not ban the importation of
alcohol.29 In response to this dilemma, they lobbied Congress for
states’ rights to keep alcohol out entirely, and their efforts were
rewarded by the enactment of the Wilson Act in 1890.30 The
Wilson Act subjected imported alcohol to a state’s applicable
laws upon arrival.31 Unfortunately for the Prohibitionists,32 soon
after the Wilson Act’s enactment, the Supreme Court suggested
that the Act did not give the states permission to prohibit the
importation of alcohol.33 The Court cemented this position seven
years later, explicitly holding that laws interfering with the
importation of alcohol were “wholly incompatible with and
repugnant to” individuals’ constitutional right to ship and
receive goods to and from another state.34
Perhaps deflated by the Supreme Court’s interpretation
of the Wilson Act, the Prohibitionists lobbied Congress yet
again to give states the right to ban alcohol importation,35
which led to the passage of the Webb-Kenyon Act in 1913.36 The
Webb-Kenyon Act specifically authorized states to keep alcohol
out of their borders.37 The Act survived a constitutional
women. See id. at 23-24. The Anti-Saloon League, “one of the most powerful political
organizations in United States history,” was another prohibitionist group, made up of
churches and other temperance societies. Spaeth, supra note 1, at 170.
29
See Bowman v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co., 125 U.S. 465, 500 (1888).
30
See 27 U.S.C. § 121 (2006).
31
Id. (stating, in relevant part, that imported alcohol “shall upon arrival in
[a] State . . . be subject to the operation and effect of the laws of such State . . . enacted
in the exercise of its police powers”).
32
See Silvernail, supra note 3, at 508 (describing the Wilson Act as a “hollow
victory for the Prohibitionists” because the Supreme Court failed to interpret the Act as
authority for the states to ban liquor importation).
33
Id. at 509 (“[The Wilson Act] simply removed an impediment to the
enforcement of the state laws . . . . [i]t imparted no power to the state not then
possessed . . . .”) Many people argue that the Wilson Act was intended to allow dry
states to remain dry, or at least that the Supreme Court should have interpreted it in
such a way. See, e.g., Spaeth, supra note 1, at 172-73 & n.81 (explaining the impetus
behind the passage of the Wilson Act, and quoting Senator Kenyon of Iowa, who
expressed dismay that the Act was not used in such a way to give states the option to
remain dry).
34
Vance v. W.A. Vandercook Co., 170 U.S. 438, 455 (1898) (striking down a
law giving state agents the exclusive right to purchase imported alcohol, because the
law gave the state, via its agents, opportunity to discriminate against sister states by
selectively choosing which to buy from); see also Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U.S. 412, 420
(1898) (rejecting Iowa’s argument that the phrase “upon arrival” in the Wilson Act gave
the state authority to seize imported alcohol the moment it crossed state lines because
such an interpretation would give Iowa’s law “extraterritorial operation,” thus
“render[ing] the act of Congress repugnant to the Constitution of the United States”).
35
See Silvernail, supra note 3, at 511.
36
See 27 U.S.C. § 122 (2006).
37
Id. (providing, in relevant part, that “[t]he shipment or transportation . . .
of any [alcohol] . . . from one State . . . into any other State . . . in violation of any law of
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challenge in James Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland
Railway Company,38 in which the Supreme Court upheld a
West Virginia law that prohibited the importation of alcohol for
personal use.39 It was not long after the passage of the WebbKenyon Act that the Prohibitionists finally achieved their
desired goal with the ratification of the Eighteenth
Amendment in 1919, which banned alcohol entirely.40 However,
the Prohibitionists ultimately lost their battle when the
experiment of Prohibition failed miserably by lasting a mere
fourteen years.41 The Twenty-first Amendment was ratified in
1933 and is the current source of constitutional authority
granted to the states regarding the regulation of liquor.42 The
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the extent of this authority
has fluctuated over time,43 as discussed in detail in Part III.
The price posting liquor laws have repeatedly been challenged
as violations of the Sherman Act; thus, an elementary
understanding of antitrust law, specifically the Sherman Act,
will be helpful in addressing the constitutionality of New
York’s price posting law.
B.

A Brief Introduction to the Sherman Antitrust Act
Antitrust laws . . . are the Magna Carta of free enterprise.44

For better or worse,45 the American economy is founded
on free enterprise. In order for free enterprise to produce and

such State . . . is prohibited”). Interestingly, President Taft vetoed the Act as “an
unconstitutional delegation by Congress to the states of the exclusive power to regulate
interstate commerce in liquors.” Spaeth, supra note 1, at 173-74. Congress, however,
overrode Taft’s veto. Id. at 174.
38
242 U.S. 311 (1917).
39
See id. at 332.
40
U.S. Const. amend. XVIII (repealed 1933) (“[T]he manufacture, sale, or
transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into, or the
exportation thereof from the United States . . . is hereby prohibited.”); see also
Silvernail, supra note 3, at 512.
41
The Eighteenth Amendment completed ratification in 1919 and was
repealed by the Twenty-first Amendment in 1933. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII,
Historical Notes (repealed 1933); U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
42
U.S. CONST. amend. XXI; see also Silvernail, supra note 3 at 500 (“The
Twenty-first Amendment gives the states the power to regulate the manufacture,
distribution, and sale of intoxicating liquors within their borders”).
43
See infra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
44
United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
45
See JOHN H. SHENEFIELD & IRWIN M. STELZER, THE ANTITRUST LAWS 6
(1993) (noting that a common critique of America’s market economy is its potential for
abuse and inevitable inequality).
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maintain a flourishing economy, there must be competition.46
Competition promotes consumer welfare47 and efficiency.48 Since
competition is vital to the success of the American economy, it
is no surprise that laws have been enacted to prevent private
actors from subverting it.49 The most basic, and most important,
“pro-competition” law is the Sherman Antitrust50 Act51 (the
“Sherman Act”).52
The Sherman Act has lofty goals: it seeks to protect and
encourage producers by “diffus[ing] economic power and
maximiz[ing] individual opportunity” to create a “fair” playing
field, while simultaneously “maximiz[ing] efficiency and
consumer welfare.”53 To effect these goals, the Sherman Act
“proscribes agreements in restraint of trade”54 as well as
“monopoly abuse.”55 Relevant types of prohibited restraints of

46

See id. at 7 (“The engine of free enterprise is competition.”).
See id. The authors point out that “[n]umerous sellers, vying for customers,
must produce goods and services of sufficient quality, and at acceptable prices, or be
driven from the field.” Id. Such a system results in better (and usually more) options
for consumers because sellers have an incentive to be innovative to attract new
customers and increase profits, or at least maintain a consistent quality of product to
keep their current customers. See id. at 12.
48
See id. at 7 (“[The] necessity [of vying for consumers] forces [sellers] to be
efficient, to buy so-called inputs—labor and materials—at the lowest possible prices,
and . . . [keep] production costs . . . to a minimum.”).
49
See id. (noting that one way competition can fail is when “private
participants in the market subvert competition and thus prevent market forces from
operating freely”).
50
“Antitrust” laws are so named as a result of practices of the large enterprises
of Standard Oil, sugar, whiskey, and others of taking the forms of “trusts,” placing
“shareholder voting power in the hands of a single managing trustee.” See id. at 8.
51
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2006). Additional antitrust laws were enacted to
strengthen the Sherman Act. See SHENEFIELD & STELZER, supra note 45, at 9. Major
ones include the Clayton Act, and the Federal Trade Commission Act. Id.
52
WALTER ADAMS & HORACE M. GRAY, MONOPOLY IN AMERICA, v (1955)
(describing the Sherman Act as “the first and most important antitrust [law]”).
53
SHENEFIELD & STELZER, supra note 45, at 13; see also ADAMS & GRAY, supra
note 52, at 177 (“competition provides an effective technique for reconciling the dual
objectives of economic welfare and economic freedom.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
54
SHENEFIELD & STELZER, supra note 45, at 14; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1. A
restraint of trade refers to an action or condition that is intended to prevent free
competition in business. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004). The Sherman Act
refers to “contract, combination, . . . or conspiracy” as opposed to the term “agreement.”
15 U.S.C. § 1. Because Professors Lopatka and Page make a compelling argument that
the Supreme Court is primarily concerned with the “element of agreement” when
applying this section, see John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, State Action and the
Meaning of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: An Approach to Hybrid Restraints, 20
YALE J. ON REG. 269, 278-79 & notes 38-43 (2003), this Note will generally use the term
“agreement” as well to reflect the Sherman Act’s prohibition of concerted action to
unreasonably restrain trade.
55
See SHENEFIELD & STELZER, supra note 45, at 17; see 15 U.S.C. § 2.
47

982

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:3

trade include vertical price restraints and horizontal price
fixing—as exemplified by New York’s ABC Law § 101-b.
Vertical price restraints involve attempts by
manufacturers to set the prices at which their distributors will
resell the manufacturers’ goods to consumers.56 This type of
behavior, also known as resale price maintenance,57 falls within
the category of “agreements in restraint of trade.”58 Post and
hold laws have typically been treated as horizontal price fixing,
which generally involves an agreement among competitors to
increase, set, or maintain prices.59 Section 1 of the Sherman Act
provides that agreements in restraint of trade are illegal, and
thus actors who violate Section 1 may be subject to criminal
prosecution.60 The key concept in Section 1 is concerted action,
or “agreement,” because without collective action there can be
no violation of the provision, no matter how anticompetitive an
individual’s conduct.61
The Supreme Court has interpreted Section 1 to apply
only to restraints of trade that are unreasonable,62 and has
developed two categories of such unreasonable restraints.63
First, there are restraints that are deemed unreasonable per
se, and accordingly, these are per se violations of Section 1.64
56

See SHENEFIELD & STELZER, supra note 45, at 65. For a simple example:
Company A manufactures whiskey and sells it to wholesalers, such as Costco or Sam’s
Club, but only on the stipulation that they will sell the whiskey to their consumers at
$30 per bottle. This agreement is a vertical price restraint because Company A, as an
upstream, or vertical, seller, is setting prices for a downstream seller rather than
allowing market forces (supply and demand) to control the resale price of the whiskey.
The same analysis would apply to a wholesaler who imposed a similar condition on
downstream retail liquor stores that purchase the whiskey for future resale to
individual consumers.
57
See id. at 66.
58
SHENEFIELD & STELZER, supra note 45, at 15; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1.
59
See infra Part III.B.; see also Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Attorneys, Antitrust
Resource
Manual,
Identifying
Sherman
Act
Violations,
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title7/ant00008.htm
(last
visited Jan. 4, 2010).
60
15 U.S.C. § 1 (“Every contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint
of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations is declared to be
illegal. Every person who shall [engage in the prohibited activity] shall be deemed
guilty of a felony.”).
61
15 U.S.C. § 1; see also Lopatka & Page, supra note 54, at 273; SHENEFIELD
& STELZER, supra note 45, at 15.
62
Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. U.S., 221 U.S. 1, 60-62 (1911).
63
See SHENEFIELD & STELZER, supra note 45, at 15-16.
64
See id. at 16; see also N. Pac. Ry. v. U.S., 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (in which the
Supreme Court states that “there are certain agreements or practices which because of
their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively
presumed to be unreasonable.”).
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Per se unreasonable restraints include price-fixing.65 The
second category of unreasonable restraints of trade consists of
restraints that are assessed under the “rule of reason.”66 In
addition to requiring an agreement to unreasonably restrain
trade, the Sherman Act also requires that the wrongful conduct
(i.e., anticompetitive practices) result in “competitive injury.”67
Competitive injury includes artificially high prices, limited
output of goods or services, or exclusion of competitors.68 In
summary, a vertical price restraint that violates the Sherman
Act is one that involves an agreement to restrain trade (by
setting/controlling prices irrespective of market forces) that
causes competitive injury. New York’s price posting scheme, of
which Section 101-b is an integral part, contemplates just such
a prohibited restraint.69
C.

A Brief Overview of New York’s Price Posting Scheme

New York maintains a “three tier” alcohol distribution
system.70 This means that, with the exception of direct shipping
in wine,71 a manufacturer must sell alcohol to New York
wholesalers, who in turn sell to retailers, who then sell to

65

See ADAMS & GRAY, supra note 52, at 164; see infra notes 252-253 and
accompanying text.
66
SHENEFIELD & STELZER, supra note 45, at 16. In general, antitrust law is
not always black-and-white, and many activities are examined by the courts to
determine “whether, on balance, the conduct is procompetitive or anticompetitive.” Id.
67
Id. at 32 (“[T]he basic inquiry concerns competitive injury . . . .”). Market
participants can cause competitive injury without violating the Sherman Act, however.
For example, a firm with a monopoly in a market is not necessarily violating the
Sherman Act despite the fact that its conduct decreases competition by excluding
competitors, as long as the firm did not achieve its monopoly status by entering into
agreements with other firms to establish their respective market positions, as opposed
to individually competing for consumers. See id. at 36 (“[P]ure, lawfully attained
monopoly is not prohibited.”).
68
Id. at 32.
69
See infra Part IV.
70
See Arnold’s Wines, Inc. v. Boyle, 571 F.3d 185, 187-88 (2d Cir. 2009) (describing
New York’s three-tier regulatory system); see also FTC, POSSIBLE ANTICOMPETITIVE BARRIERS
TO E-COMMERCE: WINE 5-7 (July 2003) (hereinafter FTC REPORT), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/07/winereport2.pdf (last visited Jan. 4, 2010).
71
New York permits both out-of-state and in-state wineries to ship directly to
consumers. N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW §§ 79-c, -d. For the interested reader, direct
shipping of wine is also a controversial issue. The Supreme Court recently discussed
the issue in Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005), and there are numerous scholarly
articles available for more information. See e.g. Elizabeth Norton, The Twenty-first
Amendment in the Twenty-first Century: Reconsidering State Liquor Controls in Light
of Granholm v. Heald, 67 OHIO ST. L. J. 1465, 1471 (2006); Silvernail, supra note 3.
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consumers.72 The New York State Liquor Authority (the “SLA”)
is responsible for enforcing New York’s Alcohol Beverage
Control Law, which is a complex set of laws that generally
prohibits deviation from the “three tier” system.73
This Note focuses on the “price posting” statute within
the ABC Law, specifically whether compliance with the law is a
violation of the Sherman Act. New York’s price posting scheme
is found in Section 101-b of the ABC Law.74 Within Section 101b, there are requirements that both manufacturers and
wholesalers file a monthly posting with the SLA that lists their
products’ prices for the following pricing period.75 After the
prices are filed, the SLA produces a composite for inspection,
and there is a three-day window in which wholesalers may
lower their prices to the lowest posted prices for the same
products.76 After this window ends, the prices cannot be
changed for the entire month without prior written permission
from the SLA.77
In light of current Twenty-first Amendment
jurisprudence, Section 101-b’s mandate that prices must not be
changed without the SLA’s permission (as opposed to being
dependent on market forces) constitutes an unreasonable
restraint of trade, thereby violating the Sherman Act.78 The
Twenty-first Amendment may serve as a defense when a liquor
law is challenged as preempted by the Sherman Act.79
Therefore, the problems of Section 101-b should not be
addressed without considering the Supreme Court’s approach
to the Twenty-first Amendment and the regulatory powers it
gave to the states regarding alcohol. This is especially true
because of conflicting language in Supreme Court
jurisprudence.80

72

See Arnold’s Wines, 571 F.3d at 187-88 (citing various provisions of New
York’s Alcohol Beverage Control Law); see also FTC REPORT, supra note 70, at 5-7.
73
See Arnold’s Wines, 571 F.3d at 187 n.1 (“With the exception of
wineries, . . . all manufacturers’ products must pass through the three-tier system.”)
(internal citations omitted).
74
See generally N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 101-b.
75
Id. § 101-b(3)(a).
76
Id. § 101-b(4). The SLA also has the option to simply produce all filed price
schedules for inspection, rather than creating a composite of them. Id.
77
Id. § 101-b(3)(b).
78
See supra Part I.B.
79
See infra note 120 and accompanying text.
80
See infra notes 89-95, 118 and accompanying text.
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EVOLUTION OF TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT
JURISPRUDENCE

Over time, the interpretation of the scope of power that
Section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment gives the states has
varied, especially regarding the “interplay between the
Commerce Clause and the Twenty-first Amendment.”81 Two
main approaches to interpreting Section 2 have developed: the
“absolutist” approach and the “federalist” approach.82
Absolutists argue that the “plain language of the Twenty-first
Amendment vests complete control of regulation over
intoxicating liquor to the states.”83 Federalists, on the other
hand, stress that the Twenty-first Amendment “does not vest
in the states any new powers, but merely restores the status
quo that existed prior to Prohibition.”84 The Supreme Court has
evolved from an absolutist stance, which was highly deferential
to state liquor laws at the expense of other federal laws, to an
approach closer to the federalist view. Today, the Court
examines these liquor laws in relation to pertinent federal
laws.85
A.

Policy of Non-Interference

The Twenty-first Amendment incited controversy not
only from Prohibitionists, but also from those who believed that
it conflicted with Congress’ power to regulate interstate
commerce.86 Beginning in the late 1930s, the Supreme Court
made it clear that it would take a deferential approach to state
laws that invoked the Twenty-first Amendment to regulate
81

Duncan Baird Douglass, Constitutional Crossroads: Reconciling the
Twenty-first Amendment and the Commerce Clause to Evaluate State Regulation of
Interstate Commerce in Alcoholic Beverages, 49 DUKE L.J. 1619, 1636-37 (2000).
Douglass refers often to the intersection of the Twenty-first Amendment and the
dormant Commerce Clause. See generally id. at 1624-38. However, as he points out, the
dormant Commerce Clause is a negative implication of the affirmative powers that the
Commerce Clause grants the states; they are therefore intertwined. Id. at 1624. For
clarity and consistency, this note will refer to the Commerce Clause or commerce
powers, rather than the dormant Commerce Clause.
82
Silvernail, supra note 3, at 513 (internal quotation marks omitted).
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
Douglass, supra note 81, at 1636-37.
86
See Norton, supra note 71, at 1471; compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3
(“Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate Commerce . . . among the several States”)
with U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2 (“The transportation or importation into any State,
Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating
liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited” (emphasis added)).
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alcoholic beverages.87 In a series of cases following the
Amendment’s ratification, the Supreme Court solidly
established its absolutist approach to interpretation, as it
repeatedly found that state liquor laws were not constrained by
other provisions of the Constitution.88
The Supreme Court’s most extreme language regarding
the extent of states’ power to control liquor can be found in
Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves.89 In Ziffrin, an Indiana corporation
contracted with Kentucky distillers to receive whiskey and
then ship it to Chicago.90 When Kentucky enacted a law
prohibiting this type of arrangement and provided law
enforcement with the authority to seize goods,91 the Indiana
corporation claimed that the law was unconstitutional because
it violated the Commerce Clause.92 In upholding the law, the
Supreme Court explicitly held in favor of state regulation of
liquor, stating “[t]he Twenty-first Amendment sanctions the
right of a state to legislate concerning intoxicating liquors
brought from without, unfettered by the Commerce Clause.”
(emphasis added)93 With limited exceptions,94 the Court only
87

See Norton, supra note 71, at 1471.
See e.g., State Bd. of Equalization v. Young’s Market, 299 U.S. 59 (1936)
(holding that state liquor laws are not limited by the Commerce or Equal Protection
Clauses), adhered to by Ziffrin v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132 (1939); Indianapolis Brewing Co. v.
Liquor Control Comm’n, 305 U.S. 391 (1939); Mahoney v. Joseph Triner Corp., 304 U.S.
401 (1938). Accord Douglass, supra note 81, at 1637-38; Spaeth, supra note 1, at 183-84.
89
308 U.S. 132 (1939).
90
Id. at 133.
91
Id. at 133-35.
92
Id. at 137. The Indiana corporation also argued the law violated the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses. Id.
93
Id. at 138 (emphasis added).
94
See Silvernail, supra note 3, at 517-19. Silvernail uses two cases that came
about a decade after Young’s Market to illustrate his theory that the Court began to
“introduc[e] chips into the foundation upon which the absolutist interpretation of the
Twenty-first Amendment is constructed.” Id. at 519. First, Silvernail points to United
States v. Frankfort Distilleries, 324 U.S. 293 (1945) as “the first case where the
Supreme Court showed signs of reining in the broad sweeping powers it so readily
bestowed upon the states in Young’s Market.” Silvernail, supra note 3, at 518.
Frankfort Distilleries was the first time the Court stated that the powers given to the
states by the Twenty-first Amendment are qualified by federal powers. Id.; see also
Frankfort Distilleries, 324 U.S. 293. Although the Court refused to ultimately decide
whether the Sherman Act limits state powers enacted under the Twenty-first
Amendment in an antitrust suit against Colorado liquor producers, wholesalers, and
retailers, the Court stated:
88

Granting the state’s full authority to determine the conditions upon which
liquor can come into its territory and what will be done with it after it gets
there, it does not follow from that fact that the United States is wholly
without power to regulate the conduct of those who engage in interstate trade
outside the jurisdiction of [the state whose law is at issue].
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began to “retreat[] substantially” from this approach to state
liquor laws in the 1960s and 1970s.95
B.

Limiting the Scope of Section 2

Upon brief review of the Supreme Court’s early Twentyfirst Amendment jurisprudence, one would think that the
Supreme Court had forgotten the importance of the Commerce
Clause.96 However, in the landmark case97 of Hostetter v.
Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp.,98 the Supreme Court finally
used the Commerce Clause to strike down a New York liquor
law that prohibited transportation of alcohol within state
borders, because the shipments at issue were merely passing
through New York for delivery and use in a foreign country.99
The Court emphasized that New York was not trying to
prevent alcohol from being unlawfully diverted for use within
the state,100 perhaps indicating that the law would have been
permissible had that been New York’s goal. In reaching its
holding, the Court explained that “[b]oth the Twenty-first
Amendment and the Commerce Clause are parts of the same
Constitution. Like other provisions of the Constitution, each
must be considered in the light of the other, and in the context
of the issues and interests at stake in any concrete case.”101 This
Frankfort Distilleries, 324 U.S. at 299. The second case Silvernail uses to illustrate that
the Court was “chip[ping] into” its absolutist foundation was Nippert v. City of
Richmond, 327 U.S. 416 (1946). Silvernail, supra note 3, at 518-19. In Nippert, which
was not a “Twenty-first Amendment [case],” the Supreme Court reiterated the strength
of the federal government’s commerce powers, citing Frankfort Distilleries for its
proposition that “even the commerce in intoxicating liquors, over which the Twentyfirst Amendment gives the states the highest degree of control, is not altogether beyond
the reach of the federal commerce power. . .” Nippert at 425 n.15.
95
See Douglass, supra note 81, at 1638; see also Norton, supra note 71, at 1472.
96
See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
97
See Spaeth, supra note 1, at 185 (“The Court consummated its full retreat
from earlier broad readings of [T]wenty-first [A]mendment power, in a pair of decisions
handed down in 1964: Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. and Department.
of Revenue v. James B. Beam Distilling Co.”).
98
377 U.S. 324 (1964).
99
Id. at 333-34.
100
Id. at 333.
101
Id. at 332. The Supreme Court also uttered the oft-repeated comment that
To draw a conclusion from [early Twenty-first Amendment jurisprudence
after ratification] that the Twenty-first Amendment has somehow operated to
“repeal” the Commerce Clause wherever regulation of intoxicating liquors is
concerned would, however, be an absurd oversimplification. . . . Such a
conclusion would be patently bizarre and is demonstrably incorrect.
Id. at 331-32.

988

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:3

decision marked a notable shift in the Supreme Court’s
approach to interpreting Section 2 of the Twenty-first
Amendment. For the first time, the Court clearly asserted that
the Commerce Clause could limit a state’s liquor laws.102
After Hostetter, the Court continued its retreat from
giving the states excessive discretion with respect to their
liquor laws. For example, less than a decade later, the Court
made clear that it would no longer give deference to state
liquor laws at the expense of the Fourteenth Amendment.103
These decisions paved the way for the Court to further restrict
the over-broad scope it had originally given to Section 2.
C.

The Current Approach to Twenty-first Amendment
Cases: The “Accommodation Doctrine”104

Beginning in 1980, the Supreme Court began clearly
articulating its new approach to overreaching state liquor
regulations. In California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal
Aluminum, Inc.,105 the Court held that Section 2 of the Twentyfirst Amendment did not save a California liquor law that
violated the Sherman Act by imposing a resale price
maintenance scheme on wholesale wine producers.106 The Court
claimed that it was following early Twenty-first Amendment
jurisprudence by acknowledging the extensive authority that
the Amendment gave to the states to regulate liquor.107
102

Id.; see also Douglass, supra note 81, at 1638.
See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 (1976) (acknowledging again the
states’ broad powers over liquor under the Twenty-first Amendment but refusing to
uphold a liquor law that violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 436-37 (1971) (holding that
while the states were given a broad grant of power to regulate liquor by the Twentyfirst Amendment, a liquor law could not deprive a person of due process). The Court in
Craig reaffirmed that “each provision [of the Constitution must] ‘be considered in the
light of the other . . .’” Id. at 206 (quoting Hostetter, 377 U.S. at 332); see also Silvernail,
supra note 3, at 521.
104
The Court’s current approach of balancing state and federal interests when
a state liquor regulation conflicts with a federal law that implicates the Commerce
Power has come to be known as the “accommodation doctrine.” See Silvernail, supra
note 3, at 524 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Elizabeth D. Lauzon,
Annotation, Interplay Between Twenty-first Amendment and Commerce Clause
Concerning State Regulation of Intoxicating Liquors, 116 A.L.R.5th 149 (2004).
105
445 U.S. 97 (1980). Midcal holds particular significance for this Note, as it
provides the foundation for how to analyze whether a liquor law violates the Sherman
Act and, if so, whether it is protected by the Twenty-first Amendment; therefore the
case is relied upon by almost all of the subsequent cases on this issue. See infra Part
III.
106
Midcal, 445 U.S. at 113-14.
107
Id. at 106-10.
103
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Nonetheless, in stark contrast with those early cases, the Court
refused to defer to a state law because it conflicted with a
federal law enacted pursuant to the Commerce Power.108 In
reaching its decision, the Court relied on Hostetter’s suggestion
that examining state liquor laws may call for balancing the
state’s interests with federal interests, but it went a step
further by actually requiring this balancing approach “in
appropriate situations.”109
Taking an even larger step away from the early Twentyfirst Amendment jurisprudence, in Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v.
Crisp,110 the Court expanded on both Hostetter and Midcal to set
a new standard for state liquor regulations that conflict with
federal laws.111 Capital Cities stands for the proposition that
courts presented with such a regulation must ask “whether the
interests implicated by a state regulation are so closely related
to the powers reserved by the Twenty-first Amendment that
the regulation may prevail, notwithstanding that its
requirements directly conflict with express federal policies.”112
In other words, the test to determine whether a state liquor
law that conflicts with a federal law is valid is to ask whether
the state law at issue directly serves the purposes of the
Twenty-first Amendment,113 and whether those interests
outweigh the interests of the countervailing federal law.114
In another notable opinion, Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v.
Dias,115 not only did the Court affirm this Capital Cities
standard, but it was quite dismissive of the earlier Twenty-first
Amendment cases, referring to the legislative history of the
Twenty-first Amendment as “obscur[e].”116 Most shockingly, the
Court declared, “[i]t is by now clear that the [Twenty-first]
108

Id.
Id. at 110 (“[T]here is no bright line between federal and state powers over
liquor. . . . Although States retain substantial discretion to establish other liquor
regulations, those controls may be subject to the federal commerce power in
appropriate situations. The competing state and federal interests can be reconciled
only after careful scrutiny of those concerns in a ‘concrete case.’”).
110
467 U.S. 691 (1984).
111
Id. at 711-14.
112
Id. at 714.
113
Id.
114
See Midcal, 445 U.S. at 110; see supra notes 109, 112 and accompanying text.
115
468 U.S. 263 (1984).
116
See id. at 274 (“Despite broad language in some of the opinions of this
Court written shortly after ratification of the Amendment, more recently we have
recognized the obscurity of the legislative history of § 2.” (internal citations omitted));
see also Silvernail, supra note 3, at 525.
109
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Amendment did not entirely remove state regulation of
alcoholic beverages from the ambit of the Commerce Clause.”117
Such a statement directly contradicted the Court’s language in
Ziffrin that state liquor laws are “unfettered by the Commerce
Clause.”118 After Bacchus Imports, there could be no doubt that
under the accommodation doctrine the Supreme Court would
take a hard look at state liquor regulations that conflicted with
federal laws.119 Still, knowing that a court will give rigorous
scrutiny to New York’s post and hold statute is barely
scratching the surface of the type of analysis required to
determine the validity of Section 101-b.
III.

THE TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT VS. THE SHERMAN ACT:
WHEN A LIQUOR LAW IS SUBJECT TO AN ANTITRUST
CHALLENGE

When a state’s liquor law is challenged on constitutional
grounds, one of the most common reactions of that state is to
use the Twenty-first Amendment as a defense.120 The same is
true when a liquor law is challenged as being in violation of the
Sherman Act.121 The Supreme Court will no longer give great
deference to liquor laws that conflict with federal legislation,
such as the Sherman Act, simply because the laws are claimed
to have been enacted pursuant to the Twenty-first
Amendment.122 As a result, courts faced with determining the
validity of such a law must perform an analysis that involves
wading through complex issues of antitrust law and assessing
the legitimacy of states’ claimed interests in order to ultimately
decide whether a state has proven that it can properly rely on
the Twenty-first Amendment to shield a state law that conflicts
with federal law.

117

Bacchus Imports, 468 U.S. at 275.
Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132, 138 (1939); see supra Part II.A.
119
See supra note 104.
120
See e.g., Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445
U.S. 97, 106 (1980); see also Lauzon, supra note 104 (explaining that under the
accommodation doctrine, after a court finds that a state liquor regulation violates the
Commerce Clause, the burden shifts to the state to show that the law at issue is saved
by the Twenty-first Amendment).
121
See, e.g., Midcal, 445 U.S. at 106.
122
See supra Part II.C.
118
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Assessing the Validity of Liquor Laws Challenged as
Violations of the Sherman Act

Section 101-b is a state liquor law and should be treated
as other state liquor laws that have run up against the
Sherman Act. The Supreme Court laid the foundation for an
intricate three-part sequential test to determine whether a
state’s liquor regulation may be sustained when challenged as
a violation of the Sherman Act.123 First, a court must determine
whether the regulation is preempted by the Sherman Act.124 If
the law does not violate the Sherman Act, then the challenger
will clearly lose because the law has antitrust immunity.125
However, if the court finds that the liquor regulation does
indeed violate the Sherman Act, it must perform the second
step of the three-part analysis and determine whether the law
has antitrust immunity under the state-action doctrine.126 The
law will be sustained if the court finds that it has antitrust
immunity.127 If not, the third step in the analysis is to
determine whether Section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment
will serve as a valid defense and save the law.128 Each step in
this three-part test is broken down further, and while the
Supreme Court has yet to give clear guidance for how to apply
the test in a given case, the federal courts have developed and
applied this test to many state liquor regulations challenged on
the grounds of violating the Sherman Act.129

123

Midcal, 445 U.S. at 102-06.
Id. at 102. In striking down a California liquor regulation, the Supreme
Court noted “[t]he threshold question is whether [the liquor regulation] . . . violates the
Sherman Act.” Id.
125
Id. at 102-03. For example, a unilateral restraint is not preempted by the
Sherman Act, or in other words, has antitrust immunity. See infra Part III.A.1.
126
Midcal, 445 U.S. at 103 (after finding that California’s wine pricing scheme
violated the Sherman Act, the Court then considered whether it was immune); Parker
v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 368 (1943). The state-action doctrine is essentially a two-part
test to determine whether the challenged liquor law should be treated as “state action,”
and thus immune from the Sherman Act, despite the fact that private actors are
involved in the law’s enforcement. See infra Part III.A.2. The doctrine is intended to
address the tension between serving the federal interests of the Sherman Act, e.g.
promoting competition, and the rights of the states as sovereign entities. See infra Part
III.A.2.
127
See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
128
Midcal, 445 U.S. at 106 (turning to an analysis of whether the Twenty-first
Amendment served as a basis for upholding the challenged law after finding the law
conflicted with the Sherman Act and had no antitrust immunity).
129
See infra Part III.B.
124
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1. Step One: Whether a State Liquor Law Is Preempted
by the Sherman Act
As a threshold issue, a court must look at the challenged
law to determine whether it conflicts with the Sherman Act.130
Even this threshold issue is complex, requiring its own
sequential two-step analysis.131 Assume that the challenged law
is a restraint of trade, in that it hampers free competition.132 As
discussed above, the Sherman Act prohibits agreements to
engage in unreasonable restraints of trade.133 Therefore, a court
must determine two things: (1) whether the required element
of agreement has been met; and (2) whether the restraint is
unreasonable. Whether the first element, a finding of
agreement, will be satisfied largely depends on whether the
challenged law may be classified as a unilateral134 or a hybrid135
restraint.136 If the restraint is deemed unilateral, then the law
has antitrust immunity because it is a sovereign act by the
state that the Sherman Act was not intended to prohibit.137 If,
however, the law is deemed a hybrid restraint, the court will
proceed to the second step in the analysis: determining
whether the restraint actually violates the Sherman Act.138
Thus, applying the rule to Section 101-b, the two-step test for
whether it conflicts with the Sherman Act consists of asking (1)
130

Midcal 445 U.S. at 102.
See TFWS, Inc. v. Schaefer, 242 F.3d 198, 207 (4th Cir. 2001).
132
See supra note 54 (defining restraint of trade).
133
See supra Part I.B.
134
A unilateral restraint is typically a state law, or governmental action, that
forces private individuals to engage in anticompetitive behavior simply by complying
with the law; there is no agreement among the individuals. See infra Part.III.A.1.a; see
also Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 475 U.S. 260, 266-67 (1986) (finding a rent control
ordinance to be a unilateral restraint and noting that the landlords whose prices were
restricted by the ordinance had made no agreement to put a ceiling on rent prices);
Lopatka & Page, supra note 54, at 273; A unilateral restraint is in direct contrast with
a private restraint, in which private individuals agree to restrain trade, and there is no
related governmental regulation shaping their behavior. See id. at 284-85.
135
A hybrid restraint is not easily defined, but as a general matter involves a
state regulation in which private individuals have some discretion as to whether they
will comply with the regulation in a way that consists of anticompetitive behavior that
would violate the Sherman Act, if not immune. See infra Part.III.A.1.a. In other words,
hybrid restraints involve a mixture of government and private action. See Lopatka &
Page, supra note 54, at 287.
136
See TFWS, Inc., 242 F.3d at 207 (describing this step in the analysis); see
also Lopatka & Page, supra note 54, at 284-85.
137
See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 352 (1943). The Sherman Act was
intended to sanction private parties that agree to restrain trade, not to prevent states
from taking affirmative action to regulate commerce. Id.
138
See TFWS, Inc., 242 F.3d at 207.
131
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whether Section 101-b is a unilateral or hybrid restraint in
order to find whether the element of agreement has been
satisfied; and (2) if Section 101-b is a hybrid restraint, whether
it constitutes an unreasonable restraint of trade.
a. Step 1(a): Is There an Agreement?
The Sherman Act expresses the concept of agreement as
a “contract, combination . . . or conspiracy.”139 However, as
scholars have noted, “the meaning of agreement is . . .
notoriously complex.”140 Indeed, it has been argued that the
term’s meaning varies depending on whether a restraint is
characterized as unilateral or hybrid.141 Since unilateral
restraints are automatically immune from preemption by the
Sherman Act,142 the determination of whether a restraint is
unilateral or hybrid may effectively result in the invalidation of
a law.143 Therefore, attempting to draw a line between the two
categories is critical.
The distinction between unilateral and hybrid restraints
of trade is not always clearly articulated by the courts.144 What
can be gleaned from the cases is that the less discretion private
individuals have in affecting competition by complying with the
law, the more likely it is that a court will find the law to be a
unilateral restraint.145 In contrast, the more discretion private
market participants are given by the law, the more likely it is
that a court will deem the law a hybrid restraint.146 In other
words, the restraint’s classification turns on the issue of
control.
139

15 U.S.C. § 1; Lopatka & Page, supra note 54, at 271.
Lopatka & Page, supra note 54, at 288 (“[Agreement] is a term of art whose
peculiar contours vary with the Court’s understanding of a particular restraint’s likely
competitive effects.”).
141
See id. at 297 (“[T]he definition of agreement in the context of hybrid
restraints differs from the definition of agreement in the contexts of private restraints
and purely governmental restraints.”).
142
See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
143
Lopatka & Page, supra note 54, at 272.
144
See id. at 269 (stating “the Supreme Court’s precedents are not entirely
consistent” in distinguishing between unilateral and hybrid restraints).
145
Id. at 283-84.
146
Looking forward briefly, a hybrid restraint of trade that conflicts with the
Sherman Act may fail to qualify as immune under the state action doctrine. There are
several steps before declaring that a challenged law is not immune. However, a law
deemed to be a unilateral restraint escapes the lengthy scrutiny that a hybrid restraint
will receive, especially if that hybrid restraint is deemed a per se violation of the
Sherman Act. See infra notes 167-71 and accompanying text.
140
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While unilateral restraints take away private control
over competitive decision-making, hybrid restraints allow
private individuals to retain at least some degree of control. For
example, in Fisher v. City of Berkeley, the Supreme Court
declared that Berkeley’s Rent Control Ordinance setting
maximum rent prices that landlords could charge was a
unilateral restraint because the Ordinance removed pricesetting control from the landlords and gave it to the City.147 The
Court went on to characterize hybrid restraints as using
“nonmarket mechanisms [to] merely enforce private marketing
decisions,” stating that “the regulatory scheme may be attacked”
when “private actors” are given “a degree of private regulatory
power.”148 The Fisher Court took the concept of “hybrid
restraints” from a concurrence in an earlier case;149 the Court
then used two cases to illustrate the concept.150 Although the
opinions in those cases did not reference hybrid restraints, they
nonetheless serve as guidance since the Court has clearly
pointed to them (albeit ex post) as examples of hybrid restraints.
First, the Court in Fisher pointed to Schwegmann Bros.
v. Calvert Distillers Corp.,151 in which the Court had struck
down a Louisiana statute authorizing distributors to enter
resale price contracts with retailers selling their products and
to enforce those price-fixing agreements against not only those
retailers, but other retailers selling the distributors’ products
who were not party to the price-fixing agreement.152 The Court
147

Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 475 U.S. 260, 269 (1986) (stating the Ordinance
“place[d] complete control over maximum rent levels exclusively in the hands of the
Rent Stabilization Board. Not just the controls themselves but also the rent ceilings
they mandate have been unilaterally imposed on the landlords by the city.”). Similarly,
the First Circuit compared a Massachusetts law limiting liquor storeowners to a
maximum of three liquor store licenses to the Rent Control Ordinance in Fisher,
because it did not give any control over competitive decision-making to private
individuals. See Mass. Food Ass’n v. Mass. Alcoholic Beverages Control Comm’n, 197
F.3d 560, 565-66 (1st Cir. 1999) (in finding that the law at issue was not preempted by
the Sherman Act, the court stated “[t]he Massachusetts statute . . . does not authorize
or direct any private agreements or permit any competitor to determine the price or
location of another. . . . As in Fisher, the restrictions have been ‘unilaterally imposed by
government . . . to the exclusion of private control.’” (quoting Fisher, 475 U.S. at 266)).
148
Fisher, 475 U.S. at 267-68 (internal quotation marks omitted).
149
Id. (citing Rice v. Norman Williams, 458 U.S. 654, 665 (1982) (Stevens, J.,
concurring)).
150
See Fisher, 475 U.S. at 268.
151
341 U.S. 384 (1951).
152
Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 395 (1951). At
the time this Louisiana statute was in effect, the Miller-Tydings Act amended Section 1
of the Sherman Act to allow agreements setting minimum resale prices for certain
commodities in intrastate transactions; that Act is now repealed. 15 U.S.C. § 1,
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in Fisher distinguished the Rent Control Ordinance, pursuant
to which Berkeley set maximum rents, from the Louisiana law
that allowed the distributers to set minimum resale prices,
thus leaving some control in the hands of private individuals.153
Next, the Fisher Court referred to Midcal.154 According to the
Fisher Court, the resale price maintenance scheme in Midcal
was a hybrid restraint because “[t]he trade restraint
condemned in Midcal entailed a similar degree of free
participation by private economic actors.”155
Even if Schwegmann Bros. and Midcal were not decided
based on the concept of “hybrid restraints,” the Supreme Court
has come to rely on them as examples of the concept, stressing
that each case turned on the fact that private individuals had
discretion to affect competition, and their decisions would be
enforced by the state.156 In particular, both Schwegmann Bros.
and Midcal dealt with price restraints, and the Fisher Court
stressed the importance of the fact that the private market
participants were the ones setting prices rather than the state,
which merely enforced them.157 This seems to indicate that where
a law authorizes price restraints, and the state does not set the
prices itself as it did in Fisher, it is especially prone to being
characterized as a hybrid restraint. Assuming that the
challenged law is found to be a hybrid restraint, the element of
agreement has been satisfied and the next step in the analysis is
to assess whether the restraint is a violation of the Sherman Act.158
b. Step 1(b): Is There a Violation of the Sherman
Act?
As noted above, the Sherman Act only prohibits
unreasonable restraints of trade.159 Of course, a state would
Amendments (showing enactment of 50 Stat. 693 (1937), and its repeal, 89 Stat. 801
(1975)).
153
See Fisher, 475 U.S. at 268-69.
154
See supra notes 105-109 and accompanying text.
155
Fisher, 475 U.S. at 268.
156
See, e.g., id.
157
Id. at 268-69.
158
See supra note 138 and accompanying text. It may seem counterintuitive, if
not unjust, to find an illegal agreement under Section 1 of the Sherman Act where
individuals are complying with a state liquor law without actually agreeing to restrain
trade. However, the Supreme Court has affirmatively stated that a violation of the
Sherman Act may be found in the absence of private agreement if the state compels
activity that would otherwise be a per se violation. 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S.
335, 345 (1987).
159
See supra Part I.B.
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prefer that a law be deemed a unilateral restraint and therefore
not subject to Sherman Act preemption.160 Even if the restraint is
hybrid, though, the state will still have the opportunity to show
that the restraint is not unreasonable.161 Post and hold statutes,
like other price restraints, have generally been treated as per se
violations.162 A state statute is a per se violation of the Sherman
Act if it “mandates or authorizes conduct that necessarily
constitutes a violation of the antitrust laws in all cases, or if it
places irresistible pressure on a private party to violate the
antitrust laws in order to comply with the statute.”163 If, as in the
cases involving “post and hold” statutes, the restraint does
violate the Sherman Act,164 the court must then determine
whether the law is immune under the state-action doctrine
espoused by Parker v. Brown.165 Considering the treatment of
other post and hold liquor laws,166 Section 101-b should certainly
reach this level of analysis.
2. Step Two: State-Action Doctrine
Assuming that Section 101-b of the ABC Law is deemed
a hybrid price restraint that violates the Sherman Act, New
York would certainly argue that it is entitled to antitrust
immunity under the state-action doctrine. The state-action
doctrine originated in Parker, where the Supreme Court
pointed out that the Sherman Act was not intended to prohibit
the states from taking affirmative action that restrains
competition.167 Unilateral restraints are not subject to the
scrutiny that hybrid restraints receive because unilateral
restraints qualify as this type of affirmative state action.168
Although hybrid restraints do not automatically qualify for
160

See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.B. Determining whether a restraint violates the Sherman
Act is typically fact-specific, but it can be superficially described as two basic
approaches. While some restraints of trade are per se unreasonable, and thus in
conflict with the Sherman Act without further analysis, other restraints are assessed
under the “rule of reason,” which essentially consists of determining whether a
restraint is reasonable in light of the circumstances. See id.
162
See infra Part III.B.
163
Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 661 (1982).
164
See infra Part III.B.
165
317 U.S. 341 (1943) (finding California’s regulation of the state’s 1940
raisin crop to be proper regulation of state industry not interfering with federal
commerce powers).
166
See infra Part III.B.
167
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 352 (1943).
168
See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
161
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such immunity, the Supreme Court in Midcal held that a
hybrid restraint will be immune from the Sherman Act under
Parker’s state-action doctrine if it satisfies two requirements.169
First, the restraint must be “clearly articulated and
affirmatively expressed as state policy.”170 Second, the restraint
must be “actively supervised by the State itself.”171
a. Step 2(a): Is the Restraint Clearly Articulated
and Affirmatively Expressed as State Policy?
The first hurdle of Midcal, i.e., whether the state has
“clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed [the restraint]
as state policy,” has typically been overcome.172 This makes
sense considering that the state does not have to do much to
satisfy the standard. For example, in Midcal, the Court said
that the California wine-pricing scheme (already deemed a
hybrid restraint) satisfied the first prong of the immunity test
because “[t]he legislative policy [was] forthrightly stated and
clear in its purpose to permit resale price maintenance.”173 So
long as the legislature makes its intent to displace competition
clear, the first prong will most likely be satisfied.174
b. Step 2(b): Is the Restraint Actively Supervised
by the State Itself?
It is the second Midcal prong that has more often
prevented a challenged restraint from establishing immunity.175
In Midcal, the Supreme Court struck down California’s winepricing scheme because it was not actively supervised by the
169

Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97,

105 (1980).
170

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
172
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). See generally Costco Wholesale
Corp. v. Maleng, 522 F.3d 874, 902 (9th Cir. 2008); TFWS, Inc. v. Schaefer, 242 F.3d
198, 210-11 (4th Cir. 2001).
173
Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105.
174
But see Freedom Holdings, Inc. v. Spitzer, 357 F.3d 205, 230 (2d Cir. 2004)
(finding that New York’s Contraband Statutes failed prong one of Midcal because the
state’s articulated interest in using them as a method of revenue production was not
legitimate); infra notes 286-288 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court has not
spoken on the issue, but if the Second Circuit’s approach is correct, then a clearly
stated intent to displace competition may nonetheless fail to satisfy Midcal’s first
prong if the court finds the policy behind the intent illegitimate.
175
Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105-06; see Costco Wholesale Corp. 522 F.3d at 902-03;
TFWS, Inc., 242 F.3d at 210-11.
171
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state, stating in a frequently-quoted phrase that “[t]he State
neither establishes prices nor reviews the reasonableness of the
price schedules . . . . [t]he State does not monitor market
conditions or engage in any ‘pointed reexamination’ of the
program.”176 In striking down New York ABC Law § 101-bb, a
“markup” statute, the Court similarly found a lack of active
supervision.177 Rather, “[t]he State ha[d] displaced competition
among liquor retailers without substituting an adequate
system of regulation.”178 The Supreme Court seems to have
established two ways for a state to protect an anticompetitive
liquor regulation. If the regulation allows private individuals to
set prices, i.e., gives private individuals discretion or control
over prices, the state must have a system in place to ensure
that these prices are reasonable.179 Alternatively, the
consequences of allowing individuals to set prices must be
reasonable.180 If the state is unable to show reasonableness, the
restraint will not be immune, and the state must then rely on
the Twenty-first Amendment’s grant of power for redemption.
3. Step Three: The Twenty-first Amendment Defense
After a state law is deemed a hybrid restraint and fails
to obtain antitrust immunity, the Twenty-first Amendment is
the final obstacle to invalidation,181 or in other words, Section
101-b’s last resort for protection. The courts have developed yet
another two-part test for determining whether the Twenty-first
176

Midcal, 445 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1980) (after finding the scheme to be a hybrid
restraint preempted by the Sherman Act). See, e.g., Costco Wholesale Corp., 522 F.3d at
889 (quoting Midcal); Miller v. Hedlund, 813 F.2d 1344, 1351 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting
Midcal).
177
New York ABC Law section 101-bb required retailers to “markup” the
“posted” wholesale price for liquor by 112 percent (but allowed wholesalers to sell to
retailers at less than the “posted” price). 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 335,
337 (1987).
178
Id. at 344-45.
179
See, e.g., 324 Liquor, 479 U.S. at 344-45; Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105-06.
180
The Court has indicated that it is worried about state authorization of
private price-fixing that essentially fosters cartelization, with no check on the
individual market participants’ power. See 324 Liquor, 479 U.S at 342 (discussing the
possibility that “industrywide resale price maintenance . . . may facilitate
cartelization”); Midcal, 445 U.S. at 106 (“The national policy in favor of competition
cannot be thwarted by casting such a gauzy cloak of state involvement over what is
essentially a private price-fixing arrangement.”). While the Court expresses its
concerns, it does not elaborate as to what kinds of consequences would be considered
reasonable, and neither do the federal courts applying the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence in this area.
181
See Midcal, 445 U.S. at 106.
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Amendment serves as a valid defense to a restraint that
violates the Sherman Act.182 First, the restraint must be
intended to serve a legitimate state policy.183 Second, the state
must show that the restraint “substantiates” that policy.184 At
this point, under the accommodation approach,185 the Twentyfirst Amendment will only protect a challenged restraint if it
directly serves the policies of the Amendment and those
policies outweigh the goals of the Sherman Act.186 If the
restraint can pass this final test, it will have survived its
antitrust challenge.187
a. Step 3(a): Was the Restraint Intended to Serve
a Legitimate State Policy?
Even if Section 101-b purports to serve legitimate state
concerns, it will not necessarily be saved by the Twenty-first
Amendment. In essence, there must be a balancing of a state’s
legitimate interests and the federal interest in the Sherman
Act.188 For example, in Bacchus Imports, the Supreme Court
refused to uphold a discriminatory state liquor tax because it
“was [not] designed to promote temperance or carry out any
other purpose of the Twenty-first Amendment.”189 While
Bacchus involved a challenge based on discrimination in
violation of the Commerce Clause as opposed to an antitrust
challenge, it is the clearest statement of the type of reasoning
that has been applied in the liquor antitrust cases.190
Specifically, if a state liquor law does not promote the goals of
the Twenty-first Amendment, it will be invalidated.

182

Both prongs must be satisfied for the restraint to survive an antitrust
challenge. Id. at 113-14.
183
See id.
184
Id. The word “substantiate” appears to be used as a term of art by the
Supreme Court and the federal courts to assess whether the restraint at issue
effectuates the policy asserted in support of it. For consistency, this Note will use this
term as well with the same intended meaning.
185
See supra Part II.C.
186
See supra note 114 and accompanying text. The goals of the Sherman Act
are fairness among producers, economic efficiency, and consumer welfare. See supra
note 53 and accompanying text.
187
See supra notes 123-128 and accompanying text.
188
See, e.g., Midcal, 445 U.S. at 108-14.
189
Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 276 (1984); see Douglass,
supra note 81, at 1641-42.
190
See, e.g., 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 347-49 (1987); Midcal,
445 U.S. at 113-14.
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Therefore, in order to serve a legitimate state policy, the
restraint must be based on a concern that relates directly to
the Twenty-first Amendment, and that concern must outweigh
the federal interests served by the Sherman Act.191 So far,
legitimate state interests have included temperance and
protecting small retailers.192 Economic protectionism is an
example of a state interest that is not legitimate because it is
not a “core concern[]” of the Twenty-first Amendment.193 The
fact that a restraint purports to serve legitimate state
interests, however, will not be enough to save the restraint if it
is not effectively serving those interests.194
b. Step 3(b): Does the Restraint Substantiate the
State’s Legitimate Concerns?
If a court finds that Section 101-b serves clearly
articulated interests that are expressed as state policies, and
those interests outweigh the interests of the Sherman Act, the
court will have one final inquiry before it may declare Section
101-b valid. The Supreme Court has held that “unsubstantiated
state concerns . . . simply are not of the same stature as the
goals of the Sherman Act.”195 Courts have repeatedly struck
down restraints that were put into place to serve legitimate
interests for failing to actually promote these interests.196 For
example, in 324 Liquor Corp v. Duffy,197 the Court
acknowledged the legitimacy of New York’s desire to protect
small retail establishments, but struck down the state’s
“markup” statute because the state failed to show that the
restraint helped those retailers.198 The Court went even further
than this, however, by pointing out that the Midcal Court had
cited evidence showing that other states with similar laws had
experienced increased failure of firms and decreased growth of
small retail establishments.199 While the Supreme Court has not
stated a clear rule for when an interest is substantiated, it has
191
192
193
194
195
196

See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
See Midcal, 445 U.S. at 113-14.
Lauzon, supra note 104.
See Midcal 445 U.S. at 113.
Id. (emphasis added).
See, e.g., 324 Liquor Corp., 479 U.S. 335, 350 (1987); Midcal, 445 U.S. at

113-14.
197
198
199

479 U.S. 335 (1987).
Id. at 350.
Id.
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clearly shown that it is willing to not only require empirical
evidence from the state but that it will also look at evidence to
the contrary.200 This type of approach is a far cry from the
original deference applied to state liquor laws.201
B.

Post and Hold Cases Challenged as Violations of the
Sherman Act

There have been several “post and hold” cases in the
federal courts since the Supreme Court’s decision in Midcal,
which can be considered the most instructive case for analyzing
whether a liquor law that is challenged as preempted by the
Sherman Act may be saved by the Twenty-first Amendment.
With one exception, each time a federal circuit has considered the
validity of a post and hold law, it has found that it was preempted
by the Sherman Act,202 did not qualify for antitrust immunity
under Parker,203 and was not saved by the Twenty-first
Amendment because the law’s purported goals were not
substantiated.204 These cases illustrate the analysis outlined above
and are indicative of how a court will treat ABC Law Section 101-b.
Each of the cases discussed in this section involved
restraints considered “post and hold” laws, like ABC Law
Section 101-b.205 The only case in which a federal circuit upheld
a challenged post and hold restraint was Battipaglia v. New
York State Liquor Authority,206 decided twenty-four years ago.
The challenged restraint addressed by the Second Circuit in
Battipaglia was none other than ABC Law Section 101-b.207 The
majority held that Section 101-b did not violate the Sherman
Act, and alternatively that if it did violate the Sherman Act, it
was entitled to prevail because of the Twenty-first

200

Id.
See supra Part II.A.
202
See Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Maleng, 522 F.3d 874, 895-96 (9th Cir.
2008); TFWS, Inc. v. Schaefer, 242 F.3d 198, 209-10 (4th Cir. 2001); Miller v. Hedlund,
813 F.2d 1344, 1349-50 (9th Cir. 1987).
203
See TFWS, Inc., 242 F.3d at 211; Miller, 813 F.2d at 1351-52; see infra
notes 254-255 and accompanying text.
204
See infra notes 256-259 and accompanying text. Two of the cases, Miller v.
Hedlund and TFWS, Inc. v. Schaefer were remanded on this issue and in both
instances, the post and hold laws ultimately were struck down for failing to
substantiate the states’ interests. See infra notes 229-233, 243-247 and accompanying
text.
205
See supra Part I.C. for a reminder of what Section 101-b requires.
206
745 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1984).
207
Id. at 167.
201
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Amendment.208 First, the court distinguished Midcal, claiming
that Midcal involved a “resale price maintenance” scheme in
which wine producers could dictate prices charged by
downstream sellers,209 and thus was not dispositive because
New York “merely requires wholesalers to post and adhere to
their own unilaterally determined prices and nothing more.”210
The majority noted that courts had disagreed over whether
compliance with a state law could be grounds for the finding of
“agreement” as required by the Sherman Act, but declined to
choose a side.211 Instead, the court held that there was no
preemption because this was a facial attack, which required
proof that Section 101-b was a per se violation of the Sherman
Act in all instances.212 Section 101-b was characterized as the
“exchange of specific information,” an activity that should be
subject to the rule of reason213 antitrust analysis, rather than be
deemed a per se violation.214 The majority then found that even
if Section 101-b violated the Sherman Act, it should prevail
anyway because it was intended to serve a strong state interest
in preventing price discrimination, and the state had not
intended to reduce competition.215
In response to the majority in Battipaglia, Judge Winter,
in dissent, argued that Section 101-b is a per se violation of the
Sherman Act. Under Judge Winter’s analysis, not only does
Section 101-b contemplate the exchange of price information,
but it also requires adherence to publicly announced prices,
which was always held to be illegal irrespective of
reasonableness.216 Judge Winter then went on to opine that the
element of “agreement” should be found because Midcal does

208

Id. at 170. The majority declined to answer whether Section 101-b would
be immune under the state-action doctrine. Id.
209
Id. at 172; see also supra note 56 and accompanying text.
210
Battipaglia, 745 F.2d at 172.
211
Id. at 173 (internal quotation marks omitted). However, the court
commented that “state compulsion of individual action is the very antithesis of an
agreement.” Id.
212
Id. at 174-75.
213
See supra note 66 (explaining that not all anticompetitive activity results
in a per se violation of the Sherman Act).
214
Battipaglia, 745 F.2d at 175.
215
Id. at 178-79. The court noted that Section 101-b could create disincentives
to reducing prices, but that the plaintiffs challenging the law had not argued this or
provided any evidence that it was occurring. Id. at 178.
216
Id. at 179 (Winter, J., dissenting).

2010]

COMPETING WITH ANTITRUST LAWS

1003

apply to Section 101-b, contrary to what the majority reasoned.217
After determining that Section 101-b was thus preempted by the
Sherman Act, Judge Winter found that while the intentions of
New York were clearly stated and affirmatively expressed, as
required by Midcal’s first prong, Section 101-b was not immune
under the state-action doctrine because New York does not
actively supervise whether Section 101-b carries out its intended
policies.218 In concluding, Judge Winter commented that
temperance would be a valid interest under the Twenty-first
Amendment but that the Amendment should not apply in the
case before the court because, in his opinion, the law was
intended to allow liquor dealers to “seek out their profitmaximizing price/output level[s].”219 Accordingly, he did not
address whether Section 101-b substantiated the state’s
purported interest in preventing price discrimination.220
A few years after Battipaglia came Miller v. Hedlund,221
in which the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that several
features of Oregon’s liquor distribution regime violated the
Sherman Act.222 The problematic provisions included: a
requirement to post future prices at least ten days before the
prices were to go into effect, a requirement that permissible
price decreases remain in effect for a specified period, and a
requirement that the posted price not be increased because of
transportation costs.223 In essence, this was a post and hold
regime because of the requirements to post resale prices in
advance and adhere to those prices. In considering whether the
regulations violated the Sherman Act, the court relied on
Schwegmann and Midcal to find that they constituted hybrid
restraints.224 After determining that they were also per se
violations of the Act because “[a]n agreement to adhere to
217

Id. In essence, Judge Winter determined that this was a hybrid restraint,
although he did not use the language. See id. (explaining that Section 101-b
contemplated a combination of state and private action).
218
Battipaglia, 745 F.2d at 180 (Winter, J., dissenting). Judge Winter stated
that New York does not set the prices, review them for reasonableness, monitor the
liquor industry’s market conditions, or review the scheme. Id. He quoted Midcal: “the
national policy in favor of competition is thwarted by casting a . . . gauzy cloak of state
involvement over what is essentially a private price-fixing agreement.” Id. (quoting
Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 106 (1980)).
219
Battipaglia, 745 F.2d at 180 (Winter, J., dissenting).
220
Id.
221
813 F.2d 1344 (9th Cir. 1987).
222
Id. at 1351.
223
Id. at 1347. Oregon’s ban on volume discounts was also challenged, but not
at issue on appeal. Id. at 1348 n.3.
224
Miller, 813 F.2d at 1350-51.
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previously announced prices . . . is unlawful per se under the
Sherman Act,”225 the court proceeded to apply the test for
Parker’s state-action immunity.226 Again, the court relied on
Midcal and denied immunity to the regulations, stating that
Oregon failed to actively supervise them.227 Specifically, the
court noted that Oregon neither set the prices nor determined
their reasonableness.228 Finally, the court considered the state’s
Twenty-first Amendment defense, stressed the importance of
balancing the state’s claimed interests served by these
regulations against the Sherman Act’s interests in fostering
competition, and ultimately remanded because the factual
record had not been developed on this issue.229
In the case’s conclusion, the District Court of Oregon
assessed the state’s purported interests in the price posting
regime, asking whether the regime in fact substantiated those
interests.230 Oregon argued that its intent was to prevent price
discrimination.231 However, the court found that there was no
evidence that price posting helped the state identify instances
of price discrimination; instead, the court found that the price
posting laws “authoriz[ed], facilitat[ed], and induc[ed]
horizontal price fixing.”232 Consequently, Oregon was enjoined
from enforcing its post and hold laws since they were not
shielded by the Twenty-first Amendment.233
About a decade later, another post and hold case was
decided, this time in Maryland. In TFWS, Inc. v. Schaefer,234 the
owner of a large retail liquor store in Maryland sued the State
Comptroller on the grounds that the state’s liquor regulatory
scheme, which required liquor wholesalers to file price
schedules with the state and adhere to those prices for at least
225

Id. at 1349. The Supreme Court held in 324 Liquor that a per se violation
may be found in the absence of a private agreement if the state compels activity that
would be a per se violation. 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 345-46 (1987). In
other words, the concept of agreement is treated differently for hybrid restraints in
that the individuals complying with the law do not actually have to agree to fix prices
in the normal sense of the word “agree.” See supra note 141; see generally supra Part
III.A.1.a.
226
Miller, 813 F.2d at 1351-52.
227
Id. at 1351-52.
228
Id. at 1351-52 n.6.
229
Id. at 1352.
230
See generally Miller v. Hedlund, 717 F. Supp. 711 (D. Or. 1989).
231
Id. at 712.
232
Id. at 715-16.
233
Id. at 716.
234
242 F.3d 198 (4th Cir. 2001).
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a month after posting, violated the Sherman Act.235 The Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals first declared that “[t]he post-and-hold
system is a classic hybrid restraint”236 because it requires
private parties (wholesalers) to set prices, which are not
reviewed for reasonableness, thus giving those parties a great
deal of “private regulatory power.”237 Next, the court relied on
Miller’s analysis to hold that the law was a per se violation of
the Sherman Act.238 The court explained that the post and hold
regime “mandate[d] activity that is essentially a form of
horizontal price fixing, which has been called ‘the paradigm of
an unreasonable restraint of trade.’”239 Maryland, like Oregon,
was unable to establish state-action immunity for the post and
hold laws, with the court relying on Midcal240 and 324 Liquor241
to explain that the state failed to set prices, review the
privately-set prices for reasonableness, monitor market
conditions in the liquor industry, or “engage in any ‘pointed
reexamination’ of the [post and hold regime].”242
With respect to Maryland’s Twenty-first Amendment
defense, the Fourth Circuit remanded the case to develop the
record, in order to determine whether the post and hold pricing
scheme substantiated Maryland’s avowed interest in promoting

235

Id. at 201-02. Also at issue in the case was a ban on volume discounts,
which the Court struck down. See id. at 202, 210. New York law also bans volume
discounts, N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 101-b(2)(a), and it is reasonable to believe that
this would be struck down as well, based on the reasoning that applies to the post and
hold law. See infra note 237.
236
TFWS Inc., 242 F.3d at 208.
237
Id. at 208-09. The Court also noted that “[t]he volume discount ban is a
part of the hybrid restraint because it reinforces the post-and-hold system by making it
even more inflexible.” Id. at 209. The court later went on to hold that the volume
discount ban was also a per se violation of the Sherman Act. Id. at 210.
238
Id. at 209-10. The Court commented that “[s]everal district courts have
reached the same result,” citing Beer & Pop Warehouse v. Jones, 41 F. Supp. 2d 552,
560-62 (M.D. Pa. 1999) (“holding that Pennsylvania post-and-hold pricing statute for
beer was a per se violation of the Sherman Act”) and Canterbury Liquors & Pantry v.
Sullivan, 16 F. Supp. 2d 41, 47-48 (D. Mass. 1998) (“holding that Massachusetts postand-hold liquor pricing scheme was a per se violation of § 1 [of the Sherman Act]”). Id.
at 210. The court acknowledged Battipaglia’s approach, see supra notes 206-215 and
accompanying text, and then declined to follow, saying that no other court has followed
it and a “leading commentator on antitrust law” had agreed with Judge Winter. TFWS
Inc., 242 F.3d at 210; supra note 216 and accompanying text.
239
TFWS, 242 F.3d at 209 (quoting N.C.A.A. v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of
Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 100 (1984)).
240
See supra notes 176-179 and accompanying text.
241
See supra notes 176-179 and accompanying text.
242
TFWS, Inc., 242 F.3d at 211 (internal citation omitted) (quoting 324 Liquor
Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1987)).
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temperance.243 The case went through several stages in both the
district court and back up to the Fourth Circuit before it was
finally resolved in 2007, in favor of TFWS (the liquor
storeowner).244 After extensive evidentiary findings (and
disputes) involving expert testimony on both theoretical and
empirical studies245 the district court determined that the
state’s evidence that the scheme promoted temperance was
tenuous, and thus outweighed by the federal interest in
fostering competition.246 In other words, Maryland was unable
to save its post and hold laws because although it had a valid
interest in promoting temperance, that interest was not
substantiated, as required by Midcal and 324 Liquor.247
The most recent federal decision to find that a post and
hold law violated the Sherman Act was in the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals, this time addressing a Washington law in
Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Maleng.248 Washington had a post and
hold system similar to both Oregon and Maryland, in that
wholesalers were required to file prices and adhere to them for
a specified period after they went into effect.249 The Costco
court’s analysis was not as clear as that of Miller or TFWS. For
example, it appeared that the court wanted to collapse the
inquiry of whether the post and hold law was a hybrid restraint
with the inquiry of whether the post and hold system was
actively supervised by the state for purposes of antitrust
immunity under the state action doctrine.250 While the Costco
court questioned the clarity of the unilateral-hybrid restraint
versus an active supervision analysis, it ultimately followed the
approach of Miller and TFWS, first concluding that the law
243

See TFWS, Inc., 242 F.3d at 212-13. The court acknowledged that
temperance is an interest contemplated by the Twenty-first Amendment. Id. at 213.
244
See TFWS, Inc. v. Schaefer, No. WDQ-99-2008, 2007 WL 2917025, at *10
(D. Md. Sept. 27, 2007).
245
See, e.g., TFWS, Inc. v. Schaefer, 183 F. Supp. 2d 789, 791-94 (D. Md.
2002); TFWS, Inc. v. Schaefer, 315 F. Supp. 2d 783, 783-84 & n. 1 (D. Md. 2004);
TFWS, Inc. 2007 WL 2917025, at *2-8.
246
TFWS, Inc., 2007 WL 2917025, at *10.
247
See supra notes 176-179 and accompanying text.
248
522 F.3d 874 (9th Cir. 2008).
249
See id. at 883; see supra note 223 and accompanying text; see supra note
235 and accompanying text.
250
See Costco, 522 F.3d at 887-88. The court was fairly reasonable in
concluding that this is a “doctrinally confusing area.” Id. at 888. However, it is clear
that a law may be considered a hybrid restraint, in that it gives a degree of regulatory
power to individuals, see supra Part III.A.1.a., but that the law may also be immune
because the state reviews the individuals’ exercise of that power for reasonableness.
See supra Part III.A.2.b.
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was a hybrid restraint. The court explained that while the
wholesalers are not required to match others’ prices, “the
logical result of the restraints is a less uncertain market, a
market more conducive to collusive and stabilized pricing, and
hence a less competitive market.”251 In other words, Washington
set up a system that facilitated price-fixing by private parties.252
The court then concluded that the law was also a per se
violation of the Sherman Act because it was “highly likely to
facilitate horizontal collusion among market participants.”253
Moving on to the antitrust immunity issue, i.e., stateaction doctrine, the court applied Miller to the case and held
that Washington, like Oregon, failed to actively supervise its
post and hold scheme,254 and thus had not established immunity
for the scheme.255 Finally, the court considered whether the post
and hold restraint was saved by the Twenty-first Amendment
defense.256 This time, a factual record had been developed on the
issue and the district court had already decided against
Washington.257 The court affirmed the decision against the
state, agreeing with the district court that temperance was a
“valid and important interest” under the Twenty-first
Amendment, but Washington failed to show that the post and
hold regulation promoted temperance.258 In doing so, the court
repeated the district court’s finding that “there was little
empirical evidence documenting the relationship between such
pricing schemes and consumption.”259
Although Section 101-b was facially challenged and
upheld in Battipaglia,260 it has become clearer over time that
contrary to Battipaglia’s characterization of Section 101-b as
the “exchange of price information” that should be subject to a
rule of reason analysis,261 it is in fact a post and hold provision
and thus a “classic hybrid restraint.”262 It is inappropriate to
251

Costco, 522 F.3d at 888, 893-94.
See id. at 894-95.
253
Id. at 895-96. Like the court in TFWS, the Costco court discussed
Battipaglia and then declined to follow it. See id. at 893-94; supra note 238.
254
Costco, 522 F.3d at 901 n.22.
255
See supra Part III.A.2.b. (explaining that states are often barred from
immunity due to the absence of active supervision)
256
Costco, 522 F.3d at 901-04.
257
Id. at 902-03.
258
Id.
259
Id. at 903.
260
See supra notes 206-215 and accompanying text.
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Battipaglia v. New York State Liquor Auth., 745 F.2d 166, 174-75 (2d Cir. 1984).
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TFWS, Inc. v. Schaefer, 242 F.3d 198, 208 (4th Cir. 2001).
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conclude that Section 101-b will be struck down on an antitrust
challenge without any evidence regarding the Twenty-first
Amendment defense.263 Nevertheless, the following section will
apply the analysis outlined above264 to Section 101-b to
demonstrate why it is unlikely that the State of New York can
protect Section 101-b in an antitrust challenge.
IV.

ABC LAW SECTION 101-b WILL LIKELY LOSE ON AN
ANTITRUST CHALLENGE

Given the evolution of the jurisprudence in the Supreme
Court and the federal courts regarding liquor laws that mandate
anticompetitive behavior, it seems very unlikely that Section 101b would be able to withstand another antitrust challenge. Section
101-b, like the post and hold restraints at issue in Miller,265
TFWS,266 and Costco,267 requires not only the filing of prices, but
also adherence to those prices. To recap the requirements of
Section 101-b, manufacturers and wholesalers must file a
monthly posting with the State Liquor Authority (“SLA”) that will
go into effect for the following pricing period after a three-day
window in which prices may be reduced to match the lowest
posted price for the same product.268 Once the prices are in effect,
they cannot be changed without the SLA’s prior written
permission.269 Since Section 101-b is very similar to the post and
hold restraints challenged and struck down by Miller, TFWS, and
Costco, it should be analyzed in the same manner.
First, Section 101-b is preempted by the Sherman Act
because it is a hybrid restraint and a per se violation of the Act.
As noted above, while the Second Circuit declared that Section
101-b simply requires exchanging price information, the
majority conveniently overlooked the holding aspect of Section
263

See Miller v. Hedlund, 813 F.2d 1344, 1352 (9th Cir. 1987); see also supra
note 243 and accompanying text.
264
See supra Part III.A (illustrated in Part III.B.).
265
See supra notes 221-233 and accompanying text.
266
See supra notes 234-247 and accompanying text.
267
See supra notes 248-259 and accompanying text.
268
See supra notes 75-77. At first glance, the statute may seem beneficial to
consumers as it allows manufacturers and wholesalers to decrease their prices to the
lowest price posted. The harm is that generally there is an ongoing possibility that, in a
free market, prices for a good will fluctuate; here, after the three-day window ends the
manufacturers and wholesalers are unable to lower prices even if the market would
justify a reduction. In other words, consumers lose the benefits of competition as the
manufacturers and wholesalers simply have no incentives to compete via price changes
after the posting period goes into effect (because they know they cannot be undercut).
269
See supra notes 75-77.
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101-b,270 which is the primary reason this type of law is
problematic. The holding aspect of Section 101-b “logical[ly]
result[s] . . . [in] a less uncertain market, . . . and hence a less
competitive market.”271 In 2004, the Second Circuit stated,
“[w]here the anticompetitive effects of a state statute obviate
the need for private parties to act on their own to create an
anticompetitive scheme, the statute may be attacked as a
‘hybrid’ restraint.”272 Section 101-b is therefore a hybrid
restraint because it delegates private regulatory power to the
distributors and wholesalers by allowing them to set the prices,
which the State merely enforces. In other words, Section 101-b
is not a unilateral restraint because of the degree of power
given to private market participants, and it is also not a
private restraint because of the State’s authorization.273 It is
also significant that Section 101-b involves a price restraint
because a price restraint is especially prone to being deemed a
hybrid restraint.274 Consistent with the Second Circuit’s
requirements under its more recent approach to the issue of
hybrid restraints, New York’s price posting regime reduces the
need for liquor dealers and wholesalers to create their own
anticompetitive scheme. Thus, Section 101-b is a hybrid
restraint subject to preemption.
Section 101-b is also a per se violation of the Sherman
Act and is thus preempted. By forcing manufacturers and
wholesalers to hold to their announced prices, the state
“mandates activity that is essentially a form of horizontal price
fixing.”275 As the Costco court explained, horizontal collusion
allows market participants to maximize profits via price (and
production) coordination at the expense of consumers by
increasing prices (and decreasing production).276 Requiring
adherence to posted prices makes price cuts irrevocable, and
thus “much less likely.”277 Furthermore, as the Miller court
270

The dissent, meanwhile, emphasized the significance of the holding
requirement. See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
271
Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Maleng, 522 F.3d 874, 892-94 (9th Cir. 2008).
272
Freedom Holdings, Inc. v. Spitzer, 357 F.3d 205, 223-24 (2d Cir. 2004)
(holding that New York’s Contraband Statutes were hybrid restraints subject to
preemption by the Sherman Act for enforcing price-fixing among major tobacco
producers).
273
See supra Part III.A.1.a.
274
See supra notes 157-158 and accompanying text.
275
TFWS, Inc. v. Schaefer, 242 F.3d 198, 208 (4th Cir. 2001).
276
Costco, 522 F.3d at 896.
277
Id.
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explicitly stated, “[a]n agreement to adhere to previously
announced prices . . . is unlawful per se under the Sherman
Act.”278 While the majority in Battipaglia refrained from
deciding whether Section 101-b could be preempted by the
Sherman Act without actual agreement between the
manufacturers and/or wholesalers, that issue has since been
decided.279 In 324 Liquor, the Supreme Court held that a per se
violation may be found in the absence of a private agreement if
the state compels activity that would otherwise be a per se
violation.280 Indeed, the Second Circuit has since acknowledged
that the Supreme Court does not require actual agreement as a
prerequisite to preemption under the Sherman Act.281 Thus,
Section 101-b is a hybrid restraint for delegating regulatory
power to private individuals, and it is a per se violation because
adhering to posted prices is illegal under the Sherman Act.
Second, Section 101-b is most likely not immune under
the state-action doctrine. As required by prong one of the
Midcal test for antitrust immunity,282 New York has “‘clearly
articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy’” its
intent to promote temperance and orderly market conditions by
prohibiting price discrimination with Section 101-b.283 In
Midcal, California satisfied prong one of the test when it
clearly stated its goal of permitting price resale maintenance as
legislative policy.284 The Supreme Court similarly found prong
one satisfied in 324 Liquor, where New York also clearly
intended to allow price resale maintenance.285 Interestingly, in
Freedom Holdings, Inc. v. Spitzer,286 the Second Circuit found
that New York failed to satisfy prong one of Midcal when it
claimed an interest in revenue production was the underlying
278

Miller v. Hedlund, 813 F.2d 1344, 1349 (9th Cir. 1987).
See 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 345-46 (1987).
280
Id.
281
See Freedom Holdings, Inc. v. Spitzer, 357 F.3d 205, 224 n.17 (2d Cir.
2004); see 324 Liquor Corp., 479 U.S. at 345-46 & n.8.
282
See supra Part III.A.2.a. for a refresher on Midcal’s first prong to establish
immunity under the state-action doctrine.
283
Battipaglia v. New York State Liquor Auth., 745 F.2d 166, 176 (2d Cir.
1984) (quoting Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97,
105). In dissent, Judge Winter stated that New York’s policy of “creating a cartel” with
Section 101-b was “‘one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed’ by the state,”
which satisfied the first part of the Midcal test. Id. at 180 (Winter, J. dissenting)
(quoting Midcal, 445 U.S. 97 at 105); see also N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 101-b(1).
284
See Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105.
285
See 324 Liquor Corp., 479 U.S. at 344.
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357 F.3d 205 (2d Cir. 2004).
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goal of enforcing a price-fixing scheme among major tobacco
producers.287 The Second Circuit explained, “an ancillary
function of the first Midcal prong is to establish the legitimate
State policy underlying the decision to displace the Sherman
Act.”288 Even if the legitimacy of New York’s interests are
assessed at this stage of the analysis, as opposed to waiting
until the Twenty-first Amendment defense is raised,289 New
York will still likely satisfy prong one of Midcal because its
interests in promoting temperance and orderly market
conditions involve public and economic interests beyond mere
revenue production for the state.
While Section 101-b will probably pass the first inquiry
under Midcal, it most likely will fail Midcal’s second prong,
which requires that New York “actively supervise” the
implementation of Section 101-b.290 Post and hold restraints
similar to Section 101-b have repeatedly failed to satisfy prong
two of Midcal because the states responsible for the laws
“neither establishe[d] prices nor review[ed] the reasonableness
of the price schedules,” and the states failed to “monitor market
conditions or engage in any ‘pointed reexamination’ of the
program[s].”291 In finding that ABC Law Section 101-bb was not
actively supervised by New York, the Supreme Court in 324
Liquor reasoned, “[t]he State has displaced competition among
liquor retailers without substituting an adequate system of
regulation.”292 Judge Winter, in his dissent from the Battipaglia
majority, stated that New York “does nothing whatsoever to
establish the actual prices charged, review their
reasonableness, monitor market conditions, or engage in
reexamination of the program.”293 As it had done in 324 Liquor,
New York persists in displacing competition without an
287

See id. at 230.
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289
See supra Part III.A.3.
290
See supra Part III.A.2.b.
291
Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97,
105-06 (1980) (citation omitted); see also Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Maleng, 522 F.3d
874, 901 n.22 (9th Cir. 2008); TFWS, Inc. v. Schaefer, 242 F.3d 198, 211 (4th Cir. 2001);
Miller v. Hedlund, 813 F.2d 1344, 1351-52 & n.6 (9th Cir. 1987).
292
324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1987).
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Battipaglia v. New York State Liquor Auth., 745 F.2d 166, 180 (2d Cir. 1984)
(Winter, J., dissenting). Indeed, the New York State Law Revision Commission reported
that the SLA does not monitor posted prices. See NEW YORK STATE LAW REVISION
COMMISSION REPORT ON THE ALCOHOL BEVERAGE CONTROL LAW AND ITS
ADMINISTRATION [Hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT PART ONE], 34 (September 30, 2009),
available at http://www.lawrevision.state.ny.us/abcls.php (last visited Feb. 18, 2010).
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adequate system of regulation by giving manufacturers and
wholesalers discretion over prices and enforcing them without
regard to their reasonableness. Accordingly, Section 101-b will
most likely not be immune, for failing prong two of Midcal.
Finally, it is very unlikely that Section 101-b will
prevail if New York asserts the Twenty-first Amendment
defense. Not only must New York have a legitimate policy
supporting Section 101-b, the law must also be effective in
serving that policy.294 In determining whether New York’s
interests are legitimate, a court must find that they are “closely
related” to the goals of the Twenty-first Amendment,295 and that
New York’s interests outweigh the federal interests of the
Sherman Act, which has been described as “the Magna Carta of
free enterprise.”296 As an initial matter, New York’s stated
interest in promoting temperance is certainly a legitimate state
interest.297 New York also has expressed intent to prohibit price
discrimination for the purpose of orderly markets,298 which is
also likely a legitimate state interest.299 However, the Twentyfirst Amendment will likely fail to protect Section 101-b
because New York will probably not be able to meet its burden
of showing that Section 101-b actually promotes temperance,
prevents price discrimination, or promotes orderly markets.
In order to show that Section 101-b substantiates its
purported goals, New York will have to spend considerable
time and money to produce persuasive evidence. With respect
to showing that Section 101-b promotes temperance, perhaps
New York could prepare analytic state studies on consumption,
possibly distinguishing between New York and another state
without a post and hold restraint in place. However, a
294

See supra Part III.A.3.
Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 714 (1984); see supra note
112-113 and accompanying text.
296
Midcal, 445 U.S. at 110; see supra Part III.A.3.
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See supra notes 192, 243, and 258 and accompanying text.
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299
With respect to New York’s interest in promoting orderly markets, this
argument was addressed in a footnote by the Costco court. See Costco Wholesale Corp.
v. Maleng, 522 F.3d 874, 902 n.23 (9th Cir. 2008). Washington cited North Dakota v.
United States, 495 U.S. 423, 432 (1990) as support for its argument that it had an
interest in orderly markets, but the court explained the concept of “orderly markets”
was hard to define and thus there could be no clear error by the district court in
deciding that this interest was not substantiated by the challenged post and hold
restraint. Id. With respect to prohibiting price discrimination, the Miller court
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Miller v. Hedlund, 813 F.2d 1344, 1352; see also supra notes 231-233.
295

2010]

COMPETING WITH ANTITRUST LAWS

1013

challenger may rebut such evidence and a court does not have
to give deference to the state’s evidence.300 With respect to
preventing price discrimination and promoting orderly
markets, New York could present state agency reports and/or
congressional studies regarding effects of Section 101-b on
market conditions, and empirical economic evidence.301 Of
course, these studies must first be performed, assuming no
such studies on this precise issue have been prepared as of
yet.302 A challenger may also produce conflicting studies, again
giving a court the choice of whose evidence to accept.303 Finally,
New York will most likely need to produce expert witness
testimony as well,304 which may also be rebutted.
This is not to say that it is impossible for New York to
save Section 101-b if it is challenged. Rather, it is to emphasize
the amount of effort that New York will have to invest to show
that Section 101-b should be sustained, and that even with
extensive evidence, there is no guarantee that a court will find
in New York’s favor. Unless New York is able to develop a
record showing Section 101-b fosters its stated interests,
Section 101-b will be struck down on an antitrust challenge.
Unsubstantiated state interests, no matter how closely related
to the Twenty-first Amendment, cannot outweigh the Sherman
Act’s policy of promoting competition.305
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See supra note 200 and accompanying text (explaining that a court will
examine evidence to the contrary).
301
See supra notes 243-247 and accompanying text.
302
This seems to be a fair assumption considering the New York State Law
Revision Commission’s recent findings:
The SLA is unable to determine industry’s compliance with the law. Price
posting information is not monitored so it is no surprise that the SLA would
fail to detect abuses in the industry. Because it does not monitor the
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For example, in Miller, while Washington argued that its post and hold
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CONCLUSION
Given the problems that alcohol has caused in the past
and continues to cause today,306 it is no surprise that New York
wants to have special regulations imposed on the liquor
industry. However, it is unreasonable to be overly concerned
with the regulation of alcohol distribution at the expense of the
Sherman Act, and the goals of the Sherman Act should not be
discarded. Quite the contrary, these goals are just as important
to the promotion of social welfare as the desire to prevent
excessive consumption and price discrimination.307 However, if
New York insists upon sacrificing the pro-competition policy of
the Sherman Act, it must take a more proactive role in
implementing Section 101-b,308 which would probably take no
more effort than putting up a strong defense under the Twentyfirst Amendment. Whether New York wishes to create or find
evidence conclusively showing that Section 101-b actually
promotes temperance, prevents price discrimination, or
promotes orderly markets, or whether New York wishes to take
a more active role in supervising its price posting system, one
thing is clear: some sort of action should be taken to prevent
the law invalidation in the event of an antitrust challenge.
Despite confusing and sometimes inconsistent individual
opinions regarding the Twenty-first Amendment’s protection of
liquor regulations,309 it has become increasingly clear over time
that the current state of the law will not permit Section 101-b
to stand if challenged.
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